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We propose a new system of modal logic to interpret Aristotle’s theory of the modal
syllogism which while being inspired by standard propositional modal logic is also a logic
of terms and which admitting a (sound) extensional semantics involving possible worlds.
Although this logic does not allow a fully faithful formalisation of the entirety of Aristotle’s
syllogistic as found in the Prior Analytics it sheds light on various fine-grained distinc-
tions which when made allow us to recover a fair portion of Aristotle’s results. This logic
allows us also to make a connection with the various axioms of modern propositional logic
and to perceive to what extent these are implicit in Aristotle’s reasoning. Further work
wil involve addressing the question of the completeness of this logic (or variants thereof)
together with the extension of the logic to include a calculus of relations, some instances
of which are found, as Slomkowsky[1] has shown, in the Topics.
Keywords: Syllogism, Aristotle, Modal Syllogism, Modal Logic, Non-classical Logics;
Semantics of Natural Language, Algebraic Logic, History of Logic.
1 Introduction
Aristotle’s theory of the ”modal” syllogism in the Prior Analytics [A8-22] has traditionally
been considered one of the most problematic parts of the entire Aristotelic corpus. Opinions
as to the overall consistency and merit of this theory have generally been unfavourable (see
for instance [10]). The different notions of ”contingent”, ”possible” or ”necessary” predication
seem to be inseparably tied to Aristotle’s physics and ontology[2, 4, 8] and furthermore do not
seem to be used by Aristotle in an entirely consistent way in his proofs of the validity of the
different syllogisms. While much of Aristotle’s theory seems to anticipate modern formal logic
in a striking way (in particular his use of concrete models to disprove the validity of certain
syllogisms and his use, as the modern mathematical logician, of a metalogic1 to formally prove
the validity of syllogisms) there is also much that seems quite intractable to modern methods.
Since the days of Bochenski and Lukasiewicz and specially more recently there has been an
active interest in interpreting the modal syllogistic using modern formal methods[3, 5, 9, 6].
But these approaches end up being quite involved and tied up with semantic and ontological
problems.
We believe that one of the most important issues is that of extensionalism. Aristotle’s
concept of ”term” would seem to correspond to either an individual or to a predicate (in general
∗The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
1We use the term ”metalogic” to refer to the reasoning processes Aristotle employs to deduce results about
syllogisms.
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unary). Such terms have an extension, the totality of individuals which fall under them. The
extensionalist interpretation of the predication all A is B is that all individuals which fall under
A also fall under B: in modern predicate logic, ∀x.A(x)→ B(x). Now this interpretation is that
of the standard Tarskian semantics of classical first-order logic. It is an interpretation which
finds its most adequate use in mathematics. It is certain that Aristotle was highly influenced
by the mathematics of his time in developping the theory in the Analytics. But the goal of the
Organon was to develop a general methodology for valid reasoning in philosophy and science,
to find a formal logic for natural language based reasoning. It is not necessary to recall here
the serious problems of extensionalism (at least in its naive form) once we leave the domain of
mathematics. Frege already remarked that in All men are mortal we are not referring to the
relationship between the unknown, vague and context-dependent extensions of the concepts of
Man and Mortal but rather to a relationship of concepts : our concept of Man includes the
concept of Mortal. It is clear that if we employ extensions then these must be partial, local,
well-defined and reflect epistemic and spatio-temporal limitations.
We point out that the ”logic” present in the Topics, which probably reflects to a large extent
the rules of formal debate prevalent in Greek philosophical schools since the time of Socrates, is
clearly much more intensional and language-based than that of the Analytics as well as having
a richer ontological texture. The Topics also contain implicitly and in a more intensional form
much of the reasoning in the Analytics. The syllogistic theory of the Analytics represents
Aristotle’s turn towards a mathematics-inspired extensionalist approach to logic. In particular
the modal syllogism anticipates modern modal logic. In the Analytics we have categorical and
ontological neutrality: the only thing that matters are terms and their extensions, the category
of a term, or it’s being a genus, species, proper or accident, is completely immaterial. A glaring
exception occurs when Aristotle’ become conscious of the difficulties in the modal syllogism
and invokes the elimination of considerations of time in predication (I Pr. An. 34b 6 -11).
Thus in order to clarify and analyse the theory of the modal syllogism we will be guided by an
extensionalist semantics. However, for reasons of both elegance and faithfulness to the structure
of Aristotle’s logic, we do not employ modern predicate logic as in [6, 3] for instance. Modern
classical propositional logic (anticipated by the Stoics but also clearly present in portions of
the Analytics) is also clearly inadequate. Our logic, called Aristotelic Modal Logic (AML), is a
fragment of intuionistic propositional logic built over a rudimentary modal term calculus. It is
given a simple sound possible-world type semantics. Connections can be made with algebraic
logic, in particular Boolean algebras with operators (modal algebras). Our approach is in fact
inspired by Boole’s original method of formalising the (assertoric) syllogism. As a term calculus
AML incorporates term negation and both particular and universal predication as primitive
notions as well as two forms of necessitation  and t which give rise to two fundamental forms
of possibility/contingency. AML also expresses several (but not all) fundamental axioms of S5
modal logic which we find were implicity used by Aristotle.
One problem in formalising the modal syllogistic using AML has to do with distinguishing
all the different species of particular contingent predication as well as the well-known distinction
between two kinds of possibility/contingency2. Bicontingency is a stronger condition requiring
both a term A and its negation Ac to be predicated possibly of B (this is explained further
ahead). It is clear that bicontingency plays a central role in the modal syllogistic though in
various places the weaker (modern) notion appears to be required for the argument to work. The
conversion of the particular contingent predication is one of the keys of the modal syllogistic.
In AML there is such a conversion, but not according to the same species in general. There is
only one species which allows exact conversion. Another point is the thin line that divides the
assertoric from the necessary in Aristotle (a syllogism is generally unchanged if ”necessary” and
2We do not wish to enter here into the classical problem of finding the precise meaning and distinctions
between Aristotle’s concept of endekhomenon and dunaton.
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”assertoric” are interchanged). Although there are various notions of necessary predication in
AML to choose from, Aristotle’s arguments sometimes hinge on a proximity between his concept
of necessary predication and assertoric predication in AML (as defined further ahead) as seen
in the conversion of the necessary negative universal. Also arguments which make this move
have also been pointed out by certain scholars as fallacious (cf.[11][301] ) as to their necessary
conclusions, no doubt due to this same confusion.
The approach via AML allows us to clarify , analyse and correct the modal syllogistic by
providing a consistent framework wherein we can refine and make precise Aristotle’s concepts
and be given ample room to choose interpretations which for the most part justify Aristotle’s
conclusions, if not to the letter, at least in spirit. In what follows we will make use of the Loeb
Classical Library edition of the text of the Prior Analytics[11].
2 Aristotelic Modal Logic
Definition 2.1 The terms and formulas of Aristotelic Modal Logic (AML) over a countable
set T of atomic terms t1, t2, ..., tn, ... are defined as follows:
• A term is either an atomic term t or an expression of the form Ac, A or tA where A
and B are terms.
• Atomic formulas are defined as follows: if A and B are terms then ?A, A→ B and A B
are atomic formulas. The last two are called universal and particular formulas.
• Formulas are either atomic formulas or expressions of the form φ & ψ or φ ⇒ ψ where
φ and ψ are formulas.
?A is to be interpreted as expressing the fact that the term A has non-empty extension. We
use the notation ♦A = (Ac)c and 	A = (tA)c. 	 represents bidirectional possibility which
we call bicontingency (see the following remark). By analogy we call t the binecessity operator.
Remark 2.2 We could also introduce ∧ as a primitive binary term operator in place of and
t. Then we could define A  B as ?(A ∧ B) and tA as (♦A ∧ ♦Ac)c. But the presentation
above is chosen to be more faithful to Aristotle’s approach.
We present the deductive system of AML in natural deduction style. We have the usual
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Where φ′ results from φ by replacing occurrences of tA with tAc.
We have the rules for atomic formulas:
A→ B B → C →T
A→ C
?A A→ B →W
A B





















The condition ?A in → W reflects the classical problem that Aristotle’s universal quantifi-
cation ”all A is B” seems to implicitly assume the non-empty extension of A. From the point
of view of modern quanitifier logic if we state that all unicorns can recite the Iliad we cannot
conclude therefrom that there exists a unicorns that can recite the Iliad.
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We also get a derived rule 	cI in which we can interchange 	A and 	Ac.
Remark 2.4 As an example of a proof in AML consider Aristotle’s derivation of the assertoric
syllogism of the third figure
?A A→ B A→ C
B  C
It could be expressed:
?A A→ B
A B
B  A A→ C
B  C
The following is straightforward:







Using (K) and the previous lemma we get
Lemma 2.6
♦A→ ♦A
This will be important further ahead in deriving syllogisms.
Remark 2.7 We could consider a further rule
A→ B Ac → B tItA→ B
and its corresponding version for 	 but it will not be used in our analysis of Aristotle’s
modal syllogistic.
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Definition 2.8 Let A and B be terms and © be either a universal or particular arrow. Then
an atomic formula of the form A©♦B (resp. ♦A©B, ♦A©♦B) is called a right-contingent
(resp. left-contingent, balanced-contingent) predication of B to A. Analogously we define right-
bicontingent, left-bicontingent and balanced-bicontingent predication and likewise for necessary
and binecessary predication. An atomic formula of the form A© B is called an assertoric
predication of B to A.
Definition 2.9 An extensional model for AML is a pair M = (I, V ) consisting of a set I of a
non-empty set individuals and non-empty set V of valuations v : T → P(I).
We define the extension Ev(A) of a term A for v ∈ V inductively:






Ev(tA) = {a ∈ I : ∀v ∈ V.a ∈ Ev(A) ∨ ∀v ∈ V.a /∈ Ev(A)}
We define satisfaction of atomic formulas as follows:
M  A→ B if Ev(A) ⊆ Ev(B) for all v ∈ V .
M  A B if Ev(A) ∩ Ev(B) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V .
M  ?A if Ev(A) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V .
The other cases of complex formulas are defined as expected. A formula φ of AML is valid
if it is satisfied in all extensional models and we write  φ.
Remark 2.10 Note that our models do not have, as usual, a distinguished actual world v0 ∈ V .
The interpretation of A→ B and A B is very strong, as suggested by Pr. An. 34b 6 -11. It
is in fact a hidden necessitation at the ”predicate” level rather than the ”term” level (cf. the
rule →K). A weaker interpretation of the assertoric in terms of an actual world would cause a
great deal of problems. Our approach also saves us from having to deal with restrictions on the
hypotheses in our natural deduction presentation of rule K. Rule K can be seen as the analogue
of using classical necessitation followed by K in the classical sense. One can perhaps think of
our atomic formulas being prefixed by an invisible A → B. In Aristotle there is in fact no
great difference between syllogisms with only assertoric premises and those with only necessary
premises. The term anangkê is also used at the metalogical level, in particular in the sense
that the conclusion of a syllogism follows by necessity. In the case of contingent predication
it is quite arguable that Aristotle’s concept was not a hypothetical predicate-level diamond
A→ B but contingent predication as we have defined. Just consider the syntax of frequently
used expressions of the type A tô(i) de B panti endekhesthai : A may apply to all B, which
should be interpreted for instance as A → 	B. Also it is quite remarkable that we find rule
♦T directly expressed in Pr. An. 44 a 6 -10.
Note that Ev(♦A) = {x ∈ I : ∃v ∈ V.x ∈ Ev(A)}. The following is easy to check:
Lemma 2.11 The rules and axioms of AML are sound for extensional models.
It seems that AML is not however complete for this class of models as the analogue of the
classical (S5) axiom is valid
♦A→ ♦A
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It does not however appear to be derivable from the current axioms and rules of AML. See
the conclusion of this paper for a possible proof strategy.
A well-known statement in the Prior Analytics is that universal contingent negatives do
not convert. If we take ”universal contingent” to mean universal right bicontingent predication
then this demonstrably true:
Lemma 2.12 1 A→ 	Bc ⇒ B → 	Ac (Pr. An. 36 b 35-37 a 9 )
We can use Aristotle’s own example. Consider a model M with I = {man, snow}, T =




M 1 White→ 	Manc
for clearly snow ∈ Ev0(White) and snow ∈ Ev0(Manc) and hence snow ∈ Ev0(tManc)
so that snow /∈ Ev0(	Manc).
Also it is easy to see that we have:
Lemma 2.13 We have 1 A ♦B ⇒ B  ♦A and 1 A 	B ⇒ B  	A
Hence to capture Aristotle’s conversion of the contingent particular (used in the third figure)
we need to make use of balanced-contingent or balanced-bicontingent predication or else make
it clear that the conversion of the left is the right (bi)contingent (and vice-versa).
Definition 2.14 By a syllogism of A,B,C we mean a valid formula of the form φ & ψ ⇒ ρ
in which the atomic formulas φ, ψ, ρ are either contingent, bicontingent, necessary, binecessary,
or assertoric predications involving two distinct terms among A,B and C. φ and ψ are called
the premises of the syllogism.
The following is easy (if somewhat tedious) to show:
Lemma 2.15 There are no syllogisms in which the premises are particular predications.
Although it will follow from the rest of our results we state here that:
Lemma 2.16 All the purely assertoric syllogisms in the Prior Analytics IV- VIII are derivable
in AML.
If we use the classical notation A,E,I,O, for given two terms A and B:
A corresponds to A→ B
E corresponds to A→ Bc
I corresponds to A B
O corresponds to A Bc
It is an easy exercise to prove all the classical assertoric syllogisms of the first two figures
using AML. For the third figure it is necessary, as we saw in remark 2.4, to add the premise
?B, where B is the middle term, in order to apply rule → W .
The following definition will be fundamental in what follows:
Definition 2.17 Two terms A and A′ are called variants if they are of the form XB and Y B′
where X and Y are either empty or one of ♦,	, or t and B and B′ are either equal, or B is
B′c or B′ is Bc.
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First Figure
We work in AML. A syllogism is of the first figure if it is a formula of the form
A©1 D & D′©2 C ⇒ A©3 C
where©1,©2 and©3 are to be filled with either a particular or universal arrow and D and
D′ are variants. We call the first atomic formula the minor premise and the second formula
the major premise.
The following is straightforward:
Lemma 2.18 There is no syllogism in the first figure in which the major premise has a par-
ticular arrow.
Given that the major must be universal, it is clear that a first figure syllogism is derivable
using →T or  T if D is equal to D′ or if D → D′ is a theorem of AML. The conclusion will
be particular or universal accordingly as the minor is particular or universal.
Let D be XB and D′ be Y B′. Then, with the help of lemma 2.3, we can easily determine
all the combinations XB → Y B′ which are theorems of AML.
Thus we obtain easily the following types of first figure syllogism:
1.A©B & B → C ⇒ A© C
2.A©B & ♦B → C ⇒ A© C
3.A© ♦B & ♦B → C ⇒ A© C
4.A©B & B → C ⇒ A© C
5.A©B & tB → C ⇒ A© C
6.A©B & tBc → C ⇒ A© C
7.A©B & B → C ⇒ A© C
8.A©B & ♦B → C ⇒ A© C
9.A©	B & ♦B → C ⇒ A© C
10.A©	B & ♦Bc → C ⇒ A© C
11.A©	B & 	Bc → C ⇒ A© C
12.A©	B & 	B → C ⇒ A© C
13.A©tB & tB → C ⇒ A© C
14.A©tB & tBc → C ⇒ A© C
The case in which the minor premise has Bc is derivable making use when necessary of rule
ccE. Note that we can obtain various kinds of predication in the premises and conclusion using
terms with different kinds of operator on A and C or introducing a negation. Thus for instance
syllogism 3 above yields:
♦A© ♦B & ♦B → Cc ⇒ ♦A© Cc
The minor is a balanced contingent predication and the conclusion is a left contingent
predication. We simply replaced A with ♦A and C with Cc.
Using ♦T and lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 and the previous list we get furthermore the following
important types of syllogism:
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15.A© ♦B & B → C ⇒ A© ♦C
16.A© ♦B & B → ♦C ⇒ A© ♦C
17.A© ♦B & B → C ⇒ A© ♦C
18.A©	B & B → C ⇒ A© ♦C
19.A©	B & B → ♦C ⇒ A© ♦C
20.A©	B & B → 	C ⇒ A©	C
21.A©	B & B → C ⇒ A© ♦C
22.A©	Bc & B → C ⇒ A© ♦C
23.A©	Bc & B → ♦C ⇒ A© ♦C
24.A©	B & B → 	C ⇒ A©	C
Remark 2.19 If we have a balanced-contingent minor then we obtain the following cases of
the first three syllogisms above:
♦A© ♦B & B → C ⇒ ♦A© ♦C
♦A© ♦B & B → ♦C ⇒ ♦A© ♦C
♦A© ♦B & B → C ⇒ ♦A© ♦C
In the first book of the Prior Analytics ch. XIV Aristotle determines the syllogisms in the
first figure with two problematic premises. If we interpret problematic as left-contingent then
the syllogisms in [11][p.261] correspond to the following instances of 16:
A→ ♦B & B → ♦C ⇒ A→ ♦C
A→ ♦B & B → ♦Cc ⇒ A→ ♦Cc
The same is true if we use bicontingent predication, in which case we have (using 	cI) a
total of four different instances of 24 which express all the syllogisms on p.261:
A→ 	B & B → 	C ⇒ A→ 	C
A→ 	B & B → 	Cc ⇒ A→ 	Cc
A→ 	Bc & B → 	C ⇒ A→ 	C
A→ 	Bc & B → 	Cc ⇒ A→ 	C
At the beginning of ch.XV we read if one of the premises is assertoric and the other prob-
lematic, when it is the major premiss that expresses possibility, all the syllogism will be perfect
and will be of the ’possible type’. This is confirmed by using the left contingent and left bi-
contingent interpretation of the universal possible premise. We simply consider the following
instances of 1:
A©B & B → ♦C ⇒ A© ♦C
A©B & B → 	C ⇒ A©	C
The syllogism in Pr.An 334 a 34 - 40 can be interpred by 15 or 18:
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A→ ♦B & B → C ⇒ A→ ♦C
A→ 	B & B → C ⇒ A→ ♦C
Although Aristotle announces rule ♦T in this chapter3 (which is used in AML to derive this
form of syllogism) the proof Aristotle gives, which proceeds by ad impossibile, has been found
to be insufficient(cf [11][270-271]). We also have the further instances of 15 and 18:
A→ ♦B & B → Cc ⇒ A→ ♦Cc
A→ 	B & B → Cc ⇒ A→ ♦Cc
Now in [11][p.275] Aristotle is aware that the conclusion is not bicontingent (endekhomenon)
but simply C not applying necessarily to A, that is, the weaker notion of contingency expressed
by ♦Ac in AML.
Second Figure
The second figure is a syllogism of the form
A©1 B & C©2 B′ ⇒ A©3 Cc
where B and B′ are variants.
As previously it is easy but tedious to show that
Lemma 2.20 All syllogisms in the second figure must have at least one universal premise.
As in the Prior Analytics the second figure is proven by using the antitone conversion rule
for ( )c in the second premise in order to obtain a syllogism of the first figure. Thus we assume
that the second premise is always universal and call it the major premise while the first premise
is called the minor.
We start by the case in which B′ is of the form XBc where X is either empty or an operator.
We have the following theorems in AML:
1. C → Bc ⇔ B → Cc
2. C → 	Bc ⇔ tBc → Cc
3. C → ♦Bc ⇔ B → Cc
4. C → Bc ⇔ ♦B → Cc
5. C → tBc ⇔ 	Bc → Cc
Looking at the first list of first figure syllogisms and using the five theorems above we get
the following cases:
1.A©B & C → Bc ⇒ A© Cc
2.A©B & C → Bc ⇒ A© Cc
3.A© ♦B & C → Bc ⇒ A© Cc
4.A©B & C → Bc ⇒ A© Cc
3see remark 2.10
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5.A©B & C → 	B ⇒ A© Cc
6.A©B & C → 	Bc ⇒ A© Cc
7.A©B & C → ♦Bc ⇒ A© Cc
8.A©B & C → Bc ⇒ A© Cc
9.A©	B & C → Bc ⇒ A© Cc
10.A©	B & C → B ⇒ A© Cc
11.A©	B & C → tBc ⇒ A© Cc
12.A©	B & C → tB ⇒ A© Cc
13.A©tB & C → 	B ⇒ A© Cc
14.A©tB & C → 	Bc ⇒ A© Cc
Similary we can derive second figure syllogisms corresponding to the second list of first
figure syllogisms in the previous section.
15.A© ♦B & C → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
16.A© ♦B & Cc → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
17.A© ♦B & ♦Cc → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
18.A©	B & C → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
19.A©	B & Cc → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
20.A©	B & t C → Bc ⇒ A©	C
21.A©	B & ♦Cc → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
22.A©	Bc & C → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
23.A©	Bc & Cc → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
24.A©	B & t C → Bc ⇒ A©	C
In the first book of the Prior Analytics the second figure is dealt with in chapters XVII-
XIX. It is stated that there are no syllogisms wherein both premises are contingent (36b 25-30).
This is reflected in lemma 2.12, for the conversion of the universal contingent negative is not
possible. This statement is consistent with the lists above if we restrict ourselves (as is natural)
to right (or balanced) contingent or bicontingent predication. Aristotle goes on to prove that
1 A→ 	B & C → 	Bc ⇒ A→ C ′
for any variant C ′ of C. For the case
1 A→ 	B & C → 	Bc ⇒ A→ 	Cc
we can use Aristotle’s own example (37a 1-10) by constructing a model (I, V ) with individ-
uals man and horse and terms Man,Horse,White in which there are v ∈ V such that man is
both White and Whitec and the same for horse and for which the extension of Man is always
{man} and that of Horse is always {horse}.
Chapter XVIII of the first book of the Prior Analytics deals with the case in which one
premise is contingent and the other assertoric. Aristotle starts wth the case in which we have
an affirmative contingent and negative (universal) assertoric premise. This can be interpreted
as either 15 or 18:
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15.A© ♦B & C → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
18.A©	B & C → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
We thus observe that our approach permits the refinement and correction of Aristotle’s
result: the conclusion is always weaker than bicontingency and this can be proved by counter-
example. Aristotle goes on to observe that by 	cE we obtain immediately the following addi-
tional form:
18′.A©	Bc & C → Bc ⇒ A© ♦Cc
At the beginning of chapter XIX we read[11][p299]: If one premiss is apodeictic and the
other has a problematic sense, when it is the negative premise that is apodeictic, there will be a
syllogism, not only to the effect that the predicate may not apply to the subject, but also that it
does not apply.
If we take the negative apodeictic as C → Bc then this is confirmed by 3 and 9. Note
that the conclusion is assertoric rather than (left) contingent.
Third Figure
The third figure is a formula of the form
B′©1 A & B©2 C ′ ⇒ A©3 C
where A and A′ are variants as are C and C ′.
One premise must be universal. Also by symmetry we may assume without loss of generality
that the second premise is universal.
It can be shown that
Lemma 2.21 All conclusions in the third figure must be particular.
Thus we must study syllogisms of the form:
B′© A & B → C ′ ⇒ A C
Aristotle’s strategy is to weaken © if it universal and then use rule  C on B′  A so as
to obtain a syllogism in the first figure. It is easy to see that as it stands there will be no valid
syllogism in this case of the third figure having© a universal arrow unless we assume that ?B′.
Hence we assume w.l.o.g that ?B′ throughout this discussion of the third figure (this follows
if © is a particular arrow).
We obtain syllogisms of the third figure of the form:
?XD & XD© A & Y D′ → C ′ ⇒ A C
such that
A XD & Y D′ → C ′ ⇒ A C
is a syllogism of the first figure. We can however in addition obtain another series of
syllogisms by applying lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 to the first premise. For instance, from ?B and
B → ♦A & B → ♦C ′
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we obtain
♦B → ♦A & B → ♦C ′
which leads, by weakening and conversion (since ?♦B) to
♦A ♦B & B → ♦C ′
Thus, using remark 2.19 we obtain the following third figure syllogisms (for ?B)
15′.B© ♦A & B → C ⇒ ♦A© ♦C
16′.B© ♦A & B → ♦C ⇒ ♦A© ♦C
17′.B© ♦A & B → C ⇒ ♦A© ♦C
Thus the only correction which needs to be added to Aristotle’s conclusions in Pr.An chs.
XX and XXI about the third figure (if we take contingent as right-contingent) is that the
conclusion is balanced-contingent, not left-contingent. Using the third formula in Lemma 2.3
it is easy to see that we could also replace the first premise by B©	A.
3 Conclusion
In order to obtain a completely exhaustive list of valid syllogisms in AML as well as counter-
examples for non-valid syllogisms it would be convenient to develop an automatic theorem
prover specifically for this purpose together with a program to construct counter-examples. Can
we find a limit for the size of models necesary to confute a given invalid syllogism ? A task that
remains is to make an exhaustive comparion with the valid syllogisms in the Analytics when
we take all the possible interpretations of particular and universal contingent and necessary
predications and compare them with the list for AML. Also we note that Aristotle’ s metalogic
appears to be much stronger than AML. Aristotle uses ad impossibile (dia adunatou) arguments
and possibly also elements of quantifier logic when reasoning about extensions.
AML seems promising for dealing with modal sorites or Aristotle’s more general theory of
proof in the Analytics.
A major question regards the AML version of S5. We must establish that it is not derivable
in AML although it is valid for our class of models. This might be accomplished by using a class
of models based on the standard Kripke semantics (that is, we have an accessibility relation in
V ) for which AML is still sound but in which S5 fails. What new syllogisms do we obtain if we
add S5 to AML (AMLS5). Can we prove that AMLS5 is complete using standard techniques ?
A further topic would be to explore the alternative presentation of AML (see remark 2.2) in
which a binary term operation ∧ is introduced. In this case the semantics looks like a collection
of representations of a Boolean algebra with operators (in this case a single operator ).
Also it quite natural to repeat these questions when considering the system resulting from
adding rule I to AML (cf. remark 2.7)
Another approach which comes to mind is a purely algebraic treatment of AML, to consider
AML as a kind of generalised lattice with operators, independently of its semantics (represen-
tation) in terms of the set-theoretic class of models defined. This might be seen as taking an
intensional approach in which we focus on the relationship between concepts.
Slomkowski has argued in [1] that the Topics includes the rudiments of a calculus of relations.
The approach in this paper might be extended to binary predicates (relations). Let ∆ be the
diagonal relation. Then unary predicates are represented by terms of the form R ∧ ∆. We
use → and  as before. We have furthermore a product operation on terms R ◦ S and an
inversion operator R∗. We could thus obtain a straightforward extension of AML in which
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could express the analogue of more complex sentences in first-order logic but with the added
benefit of modalities. Algebraically this gives rise to structure similar to that of a quantale4
but with an operator.
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